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Abstract
Predicting click and conversion probabilities when bidding on ad ex-
changes is at the core of the programmatic advertising industry. Two
separated lines of previous works respectively address i) the prediction of
user conversion probability and ii) the attribution of these conversions to
advertising events (such as clicks) after the fact. We argue that attribu-
tion modeling improves the efficiency of the bidding policy in the context
of performance advertising.
Firstly we explain the inefficiency of the standard bidding policy with
respect to attribution. Secondly we learn and utilize an attribution model
in the bidder itself and show how it modifies the average bid after a click.
Finally we produce evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed method
on both offline and online experiments with data spanning several weeks
of real traffic from Criteo, a leader in performance advertising.
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1 Introduction
Performance advertising has become a very successful model of programmatic
advertising where advertisers payment is based on delivered value as measured
by events of interest. Two main models exist: cost-per-click (CPC) or cost-per-
action (CPA). We focus on the latter where the advertiser attributes conversion
events (e.g. a signup or more generally a sale) to one (or more) advertising events
such as displays or clicks. The industry standard for conversion attribution is
to credit only the last click in the 30 days before the conversion although this
is changing recently Ji et al. (2016).
For advertising agencies and platforms the state of the art strategy is the
Expected Value Bidder (EVB) that bids the expected value of the opportu-
nity Perlich et al. (2012) Rosales et al. (2012). EVB has been proven to be a
dominant strategy in the case of non-repeated second-price auctions Easley and
Kleinberg (2010). The expected value is computed as advertiser payment times
the predicted conversion probability. Numerous previous studies focused on
accurately estimating click or conversion probabilities at scale Chapelle (2014)
Rosales et al. (2012) and open datasets were published for this task (Criteo,
2014) Zhang et al. (2004).
On the other side, conversion attribution has been thoroughly studied in
the fields of game theory and econometrics Shao and Li (2011) Abhishek et al.
(2012) Dalessandro et al. (2012) and mechanisms have been proposed to better
∗contributed equally - contact {e.diemert,j.meynet}@criteo.com
†work done while at Criteo
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match the advertiser payment with the ad effectiveness, especially when multiple
advertising events or channels are involved.
In order to improve the EVB policy one can research the usage of attribution
prediction. A motivational example is to consider consecutive auctions for the
same user. If the user has clicked after the first impression the advertising plat-
form has good chances of getting the attribution, in the sense that a consecutive
conversion would be attributed to that click - unless another advertising event
captures the attribution in between. In a subsequent auction, a rational bidding
policy should take into account this non-zero attribution probability and lower
its bid compared to the first one as there is little chance that a second click
would increase the attribution probability. The EVB policy is not able to act
rationally in that respect since it doesn’t keep track nor predicts the attribution
probability evolution. As a first exploratory step towards improved real-time
bidding policies for advertising we propose to leverage an attribution model to
modify the bidding strategy.
We posit that an attribution bidding policy has the benefit of better aligning
the incentives of the advertiser with the ones of the advertising platform and
the user, resulting in increased efficiency for all parties involved. Intuitively this
comes from a better representation of the effect of advertising over time: the
advertiser should pay for ads that affect attributed conversions, the platform
should reduce its costs when bidding for ads with low attribution probability
and the user should see less ads once engaged with the advertiser.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Firstly we describe our core
contribution: a suitable attribution model in Section 2.1 and the related mod-
ifications to the bidding strategy in Section 2.2. We then explain in Section
3 how to measure the improvement offline with an updated version of the Ex-
pected Utility metric Chapelle (2015). We report and analyze positive results
from both offline and online experiments in Section 4. Finally we discuss future
works and connections to other related approaches in Section 5.
2 Model
2.1 Attribution Model
The industry standard for conversion attribution is to credit the advertizing
platform which owns the last click in a 30 days window before the conversion.
Predicting the 30 days conversion probability is thus not enough as different
events may change the attribution probability until the conversion actually hap-
pens: the competition (or other channels such as search-based advertising) may
capture the attribution by generating clicks on their side. This characteristic of
the last-click attribution has been shown to drive more efforts on average from
advertising platforms and thus be more effective than other mechanisms in the
case of cost-per-mil (CPM) payment models Berman (2015). However from the
same study we observe that it is not obvious for performance advertising (CPC
or CPA). It was also shown in (Xu et al., 2016) that last-click attribution might
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prevent advertising platform to bid proportionally to the real marginal impact
of the ad on the user conversion.
In the following model we do not explicitly assume that the advertiser uses
last-click attribution to reward advertising platforms, but instead we propose to
learn attribution from the data and then incorporate it in the bidder itself. We
consider the point of view of an advertising platform having access to advertiser
conversions and their attribution label. We don’t assume access to competition
data such as clicks made by other platforms.
Let us introduce the notation: C is a random variable representing the click,
S any conversion (attributed or not), A an attributed conversion, all of which
are Bernoulli. X is the generic random variable representing all available con-
textual information (such as the user context, website information, advertising
campaign). ∆ is the delay between a conversion and a click observed prior to it.
The task of attribution modeling consists in learning P (A = 1|S = 1, X = x)
the probability of attributed conversion given there is a conversion, in a certain
context x.
To be used for driving the bidding strategy the attribution model needs to
capture important aspects of the attribution process such as the implementation
used by the advertiser and the characteristics of the competition. We propose
to use mainly two sources of information:
• δ: the time since the last click generated by the advertising platform
that captures the uncertainty of still having the attribution in the face of
competitive events
• x: capturing global characteristics such as per advertiser implementation,
user activity level , etc.
The proposed model is an exponential decay model of δ: the time between
the conversion and the last click, parametrized by a decay factor λ:
P (A = 1|S = 1, X = x,∆ = δ) = e−λ(x)δ , λ(x) ≥ 0 (1)
The λ decay factor represents here the speed at which the attribution prob-
ability decreases with time after the click (taking into account events such
as competitors winning the attribution thanks to clicks on their ads). This
model is not specific to last-click attribution. It may work under other attribu-
tion schemes as soon as the attribution probability vanishes over time after the
clicks. The choice of this exponential decay is quite common in survival analysis
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) and was also used to model delays in conversion
feedback Chapelle (2014). Models that better fit the data such as Kaplan-Meier
or Weibull Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) could be considered, but fine tuning
the attribution model is not in the scope of the paper.
2.1.1 Model Estimation
We estimate λ by maximum likelihood. Let’s consider a dataset built using
clicks-conversion log as follows: {(δi, ai)}i=1...n where δi is the time since last
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Figure 1: Internal attribution procedure from the advertising platform point
of view in a case where 3 clicks precede an attributed conversion. 5 possibles
schemes are illustrated: last-click ALC , first click AFC , uniform AU , all-clicks
AALL and an attribution equivalent to our attribution model AAM .
click of that particular conversion and ai the attribution: 1 if attributed, 0 if
not to the advertising platform. Under the assumption P (ai = 1 | δi) = e−λδi
we can write the conditional likelihood of the data and our convex cost function,
the negative log-likelihood.
LH(λ) =
n∏
i=1
P (Ai = ai | δi) =
n∏
i=1
e−λaiδi(1− e−λδi)1−ai (2)
NLLH(λ) =
n∑
i=1
λaiδi − (1− ai)log(1− e−λδi) (3)
2.2 Attribution-aware Bidder
As mentioned before, the standard bidding strategy, in 2nd price auctions, is
to bid the expected value of an impression Perlich et al. (2012). As last-click
attribution is usually assumed for the advertiser, previously published works
also use last-click attribution when learning the conversion models, meaning
that when several clicks occur before a conversion in the logs, only the last one is
labelled as positive while previous ones are labelled as negative samples. Figure
1 gives an illustrative example of the internal attribution procedure when 3
clicks occurred before an attributed conversion for a given advertising platform.
Let us call ALC the random variable that measures if there was an attributed
conversion in the 30 days after the click and this click was the last for the
advertising platform. The bid value for an impression is estimated as:
bid ∝ CPA× P (ALC = 1|X = x) (4)
We can consider simple variants of this strategy by applying rule-based
heuristics on the attribution process, by considering, for example, first-click
(AFC), uniform (AU ) or linear attribution (some of them are depicted in in
Figure 1). In fact we could argue that first clicks might have contributed more
to user conversions than last ones. However, there is no evidence that fixed
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rules can work without making very strong hypotheses on the advertiser attri-
bution scheme. Another alternative would be to consider all clicks leading to a
conversion as positive examples (AALL) but, as other fixed rules, such a scheme
cannot catch temporal dependencies between the auctions, which represents a
key aspect in proper attribution modeling. In the example of Figure 1, how
should the conversion be attributed to each click? The first click might have
more impact on the conversion but as the third one is closer to the conversion
so it might also be important. In all cases click2 seems to have less importance
than the other two.
In line with lift-based bidding (Xu et al., 2016) we propose to bid propor-
tionally to the marginal attribution brought by the current opportunity: if the
user recently clicked on one of our ads, we already have some probability to
get the attribution and showing more ads to the user might not be relevant for
her given the recent interaction she had with the advertiser. To estimate the
current attribution probability, we leverage the attribution model presented in
Section 2.1.
At auction time, the gap between the current opportunity and the conver-
sion δs if the user eventually converts is unknown. However, we can measure
the time elapsed since the last observed click δc, which gives a good proxy for
estimating the uncertainty under which we can hope to get an attribution from
past auctions. The attribution probability from the previous-click only is, ac-
cording to Equation (1): e−λ(x)(δs+δc). Now, if current auction leads to another
click, our attribution probability becomes e−λ(x)δs . The marginal contribution
of the second click, normalized so that we can fully explain the conversion is
then:
e−λ(x)δs − e−λ(x)(δs+δc)
e−λ(x)δs
= 1− e−λ(x)δc (5)
The attribution-aware bidder directly modulates the attributed conversion
probability by the marginal contribution of this opportunity:
b(x) ∝ CPA× P (AALL = 1|X = x)(1− e−λ(x)δc) (6)
where δc is the observed time since last click, and AALL refers to whether the
display led to an attributed conversion or not. The first part of the model
P (AALL = 1|X = x) represents the post-click conversion probability without
any assumption on the internal attribution process, while second term handles
the attribution part.
2.2.1 Discussion
If there is no previous click, second term vanishes and the bidder acts as the
baseline EVB bidder, with one notable difference: all clicks leading to a con-
version are labelled as positive, while only the last-one would be positive in the
baseline. The fact last-clicks of a given advertising platform are not favored in
the learning is good from the advertiser perspective: the platform is not incen-
tivised to "steal" the attribution when the true impact of the advertising on
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the conversion is low. On the other hand, right after a click, the attribution
bidder will drastically decrease the bid values. The recent click already gives a
good probability of getting the attribution would there be a conversion. We also
think that displaying new ads after a click does not increase the user propensity
to convert, so investing the money elsewhere is a better strategy. Ideally, as
explained in (Xu et al., 2016), if the advertiser attribution process credits each
event according to its causal impact on the conversion a bidder should only bid
the lift in the conversion probability.
As a click is a strong engagement signal from the user we expect the law
of diminishing return to apply to the impact of subsequent displays. However,
baseline EVB models tend to bid higher after a click which increase both adver-
tising costs and user exposure. The proposed bidder is thus closer to a lift-based
bidder.
3 Metrics
3.1 Offline Metrics in Online Advertising
Offline evaluation of bidding policies is especially important in advertising as
online experiments imply to invest real money in ad auctions. Therefore offline
evaluation consists in replaying logged auctions that were won by a previous
production policy Zhang et al. (2004). Lost auctions are not used as the bid
needed to win the auction is unknown (which impairs counter-factual evaluation
due to selection bias). Still, as the state-of-the-art EVB strategy is to bid one’s
expected value i.e. payoff×conversion_probability, classical offline metrics focus
on the prediction problem as the payoff is usually fixed for a given campaign.
Weighted Mean Squared Error Vasile et al. (2017) combine event payoff and
prediction quality in a single metric. However such metric may not accurately
predict online results if the competition changes. Recently Chapelle (2015)
proposed Utility to tackle this problem by injecting noise in the competing bids
distribution.
We now briefly describe the Utility metric before exploring its limits with
respect to attribution in the following section.
Consider vi, the value for the advertising platform of an action on an ad
(e.g. a conversion value), pi the estimated probability of a user performing that
action. In this setup the value of the impression can be estimated as vi × pi.
Let ci be the observed price, which is the highest competing bid in a second
price auction, and ai a binary variable that represent if the action is attributed
to the display or not. Then the payoff of the auction can be written as:
ui = (ai × vi − ci)1[pi×vi>ci] (7)
The Utility of a new prediction model p′ is estimated on dataset D as:
U(p′) =
∑
i∈D
(ai × vi − ci)1[p′ivi>ci] (8)
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Expected utility was proposed to model potential changes in the competing
bids using a cost distribution Pr(c|ci) instead of the actual observed cost:
EU(p′) =
∑
i∈D
∫ p′i×vi
0
(ai × vi − c) Pr(c|ci)dc (9)
A good choice for Pr(c|ci) is a Gamma distribution, parametrized by α, β: It
interpolates between two extreme cases: empirical utility and WMSE Chapelle
(2015):
Pr(c|ci) ∼ Γ(α = βci + 1, β) (10)
As in Chapelle (2015) we use: α = βc+ 1.
3.2 Attribution-aware Expected Utility
The expected utility basically supposes the conversions are attributed implicitly
on a single display, usually the last-clicked display before the conversions. Eval-
uating other bidders on this metric will naturally favor last-click based bidder.
Therefore, we propose to extend the metric by taking into account the attribu-
tion evolution. For this purpose we weigh the value of each display to make it
depend on the attribution function a : x ∈ RN 7→ R:
AEU(p′, a) =
∑
i∈D
∫ p′i×vi
0
(a(xi)× vi − c) Pr(c|ci)dc (11)
If the attribution rule is last-click, then AEU is exactly equivalent to Ex-
pected Utility:
alc(x) =
{
1 if x is last-click
0 otherwise
(12)
A natural choice for the attribution function is to re-use the attribution
model proposed in Section 2.1:
aam(x) =
{
1− e−λ(x)δc if x was clicked
0 otherwise
(13)
As this attribution scheme is not normalized, each conversion may not contribute
equally to the metric (attributions of all displays preceding a conversion might
not sum to one). This tends to penalize conversions for which the last click
occurred long time ago: we believe it is a desired property for a metric to limit
the importance of conversions that occurred days or even weeks after clicks,
as the real causal impact of these clicks is expected to be small. Anyway we
also report in the experiments a normalized version (where each conversion
contributes the same amount, as shown by AAM in Figure 1) in addition to the
raw one.
A risk of the AEU is to choose a bidder that overfits the learned attribution
model. In that case we advise to consider a regularized version that, for example,
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would not be strictly dependent on the lambda parameter of the model. It is
however not in the scope of this paper and will be left for future research.
In the remaining of the paper, for sake of simplicity, we call UA the AEU us-
ing normalized proposed attribution model, UA∗ its un-normalized counterpart
and ULC the variant with last-click attribution function.
4 Experiments
4.1 Criteo Attribution Dataset
Attribution information (the difference between all sales observed on an ad-
vertiser site and attributed ones) is mandatory for our study and not present
in previously published conversion datasets Criteo (2014) Zhang et al. (2004).
Therefore for all offline experiments we use a log sampled from 30 days of Criteo
production traffic with displays, clicks, conversions and attribution data. It will
be released publicly at http://research.criteo.com. The data has been sub-
sampled and anonymized so as not to disclose proprietary elements but the
exact method is irrelevant here. Each line represents an ad impression with
following information: timestamp, price paid, categorical features of the user,
ad and publisher, click*, position of the click*, conversion*, conversion value*,
attribution*.
Elements marked with a * are present if applicable. Conversion and their
value are credited by the advertiser and made comparable across the dataset. If
multiple clicks occurred and there was a conversion the click position is provided,
which is necessary for implementing different attribution schemes.
4.2 Attribution Study
The model presented in Section 2.1 encodes the attribution probability as a
function of the time between a click and the conversion. The empirical attribu-
tion rate as function of this delay is illustrated on Figure2 and shows a sharp
decline in attribution rate after a click followed by a slower decrease tending to
0 after 30 days.
We estimated a global λˆ ≈ 6.25 × 10−6 on the log. It is remarkably stable
over time with a daily relative variation < 0.1%. As seen on Figure 3 the λ
parameter is also stable across advertisers. We posit that fitting one parameter
per advertiser would only improve the training objective marginally and thus
prefer to use a global one.
4.3 Offline Evaluation
4.3.1 Baselines
The tested bidding strategies include two expected value bidders. LCB is the
traditional baseline defined in Eq. 4. First-click bidder (FCB) is its first-click
counterpart. Both actually use the same features but different labels for learning
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Figure 2: Average attribution given conversion and time since last click
Figure 3: Distribution of per advertiser λˆa versus global λˆ
Figure 4: Average attribution rate per display, given time since last click for
two attribution schemes
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UA ULC
AB vs LCB +12.32% -14.15%
Table 1: Offline comparison of Attribution (AB) versus Last-Click
(LCB) bidders. UA and ULC refer to variants of AEU with resp.
last-click or proposed attribution model and cost perturbation β = 1000.
Result is significant at the .05 quantile of 100 bootstraps resamples.
the conversion model. To understand the difference we observe the attribution
rate with respect to an important variable: time since last click, as illustrated
on Figure 4. We observe a high proportion of positive examples for LCB within
a short delay after a click and that proportion decreases with the delay. Con-
versely, for FCB the initial proportion is low and increases slowly over time.
Our proposed attribution bidder (AB) defined per Equation 6 is composed
of two multiplicative parts. As described earlier the bid values will drastically
decrease right after clicks as can be deduced from Figure 2.
4.3.2 Evaluation Setup
Our evaluation protocol is as follows: the last 7 days of log are considered for
testing and for each test day we use the 21 previous days for learning. For
learning conversion models, all the variables are mapped into a sparse binary
feature vector via the hashing trick and an L2-penalized logistic regression model
is trained using the L-BFGS algorithm (similar to Singh (2015)). The evaluation
metrics are variants of the Attribution-aware Expected Utility: UA, UA∗, and
ULC as presented in Section 4.2. In order to have comparable values between
bidders for a given metric, predictions are calibrated so as to predict the same
value on average. In a real system this calibration property is usually controlled
by a feedback loop mechanism to ensure constant spend. More details are given
in Section 4.4. For each variant of Utility, we use different β ∈ (1000/inf) which
correspond to medium/no variations of the competing bids.
4.3.3 Results & Discussion
Our first result is summarized in Table 1: as expected the proposed AB is
favored by the Utility when the attribution is given by the same attribution
model. Conversely, LCB is favored by the last-click Utility. We notice in this
result how LCB becomes sub-optimal when the metric focuses on earlier clicks.
At this point we posit that the Utility that uses an attribution model UA best
reflects the real attribution system.
Our second result is summarized in Table 2: when measured across different
variants of the UA, the proposed AB policy performs the best among the three.
The reported win rate tells us that LCB wins 5% more auctions than AB,
auctions that are probably less valued by the metric, representing excessive
post-click user exposure. Event though FCB performs quite on par with AB
on the normed Utility UA this is not the case with the un-normed UA∗ version
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LCB FCB AB
Win Rate 0.94 0.90 0.89
UA, β1000 1679± 31 1843± 37 1886± 39
UA, βinf 3383± 46 3471± 52 3549± 58
UA∗, β1000 2852± 43 2888± 43 3396± 53
UA∗, βinf 5105± 56 5083± 57 5408± 61
Table 2: Offline comparison of 3 bidders (Last-click LCB, first-click
(FCB) and attribution bidder (AB)). UA/UA∗ refers to Eq. 11 with cost
perturbation β and normed/un-normed attribution model.
and the gap grows larger with smaller β (βinf : +6% / β1000:+17%), i.e when
there is more uncertainty on the competing bids. This let us think AB is more
robust in real systems. This confirms the comments in Section 3.2. Thoroughly
evaluating UA deserves to study the correlation of offline versus online results.
We deliberately skip such analyses in the current work as it is not the main
focus of this paper.
Our third result presented in Figure 5 illustrates the average post-click bid
evolution for the different bidders in the first 24 hours. As expected, LCB
overbids strongly just after a click and then slowly converges to the nominal pre-
click bid. Conversely, FCB underbids after a click (although less sharply than
LCB) and overbids increasingly compared to the pre-click level. We observe
that our proposed AB policy bids at an extremely low level just after a click
and then steadily increases its bids.
Figure 5: Average bid given time since last click for different bidding strategies
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4.4 Online Experiments
4.4.1 Experimental Setting
We fit an attribution model with a global λ using the procedure described
in Section 2.1.1. We learn an attribution model encompassing the business
standard which means looking back up to 30 days before the conversion for
potential clicks.
Our online experimental policy is a simple multiplier applied to all bids:
bidtest ∝ bidref A (1−B e−λδ) (14)
This implementation is straightforward and flexible for different practical use
cases. Firstly, it allows for more or less aggressive bid decreases thanks to the B
factor: small B will only slightly change the reference bidding policy. Secondly,
the proposed bidding policy consists only in reducing bids and hence should
result in under-spending with respect to the reference population. To compare
policies one should be able to measure their performance in a setting where
both spend the entire available advertiser budget. The A factor can be used to
equalize spent budget between the control and test populations for this purpose.
Different values for the A and B parameters have been A/B tested by user
split on the Criteo production platform.
4.4.2 Results & Discussion
∆OEC
(long term)
Revenue
(short term)
Advertiser
ROI
User ad
exposure
+5.5% negative positive lower
Table 3: Online results summary. OEC is a long-term performance metric.
We report the uplift of the proposed bidder wrt. the baseline production
bidder. All reported results are significant at the .05 quantile of 100
bootstraps resamples.
Overall results are summarized in Table 3. We found that the proposed
bidding policy showed positive long-term results in all settings. The Over-
all Evaluation Criterion (OEC) Kohavi et al. (2007) reported for this exper-
iment captures the value generated by Criteo for the advertisers: OEC ∝
(AdvertiserV alue − Cost) and is not necessarily correlated to short-term rev-
enue. The consistent improvement of the OEC by +5.5% across all production
traffic is remarkable since it is quite rare given the difficulty to move such long
term criteria.
The OEC was moved mainly through reducing bids and hence budget spend
in subsequent auctions. The accompanying negative impact in revenue shall be
explained as follows. A better efficiency of the proposed bidding policy delivers
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more value for less cost, hence reducing the spend of advertisers (and Criteo
revenue) to achieve a target CPA. Of course rational advertisers should then
increase their target CPA to benefit from additional value.
From a user perspective such policies reduced drastically the exposition to
ads from a given advertiser after a click on an ad of that advertiser. Incidentally,
and beyond overall reduced exposure, it brought more diversity on ads seen as
other advertisers on the Criteo platform had now better chances of winning bids.
For advertisers we noticed an increased return on investment (ROI) as mea-
sured by the number of conversions (or conversions values) generated for a given
budget.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a novel, effective yet simple bidding policy leveraging attribution
modeling. Our model can be trained efficiently and requires minimal changes to
be implemented in an advertising platform. We proposed a modification of the
Utility offline metric. We also reported highly positive experiments both offline
and online at scale on Criteo production platform.
We plan to release the dataset used for offline experiments under the same
conditions as previous Criteo datasets so as to foster additional research in at-
tribution modeling. An immediate perspective would be to study alternative at-
tribution models and their impact. Future works could also include researching
this problem in i) the reinforcement learning setting where the state would in-
corporate the attribution evolution and ii) the online learning framework where
attributed value is learnt across repeated auctions in the spirit of Weed et al.
(2015).
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